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THE CRIMINAL JURY, MORAL 
JUDGMENTS, AND POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION 
Youngjae Lee* 
Was the sexual act consensual? Did the defendant have a reasonable 
belief that he was in imminent danger of death by an attacker? Did the po-
lice use excessive force? Did the defendant act in a heinous or cruel man-
ner? Did the defendant act with depraved indifference to human life? The-
se are some of the questions that criminal juries encounter. 
Determinations of such questions involve a combination of factual and 
moral questions, both questions about what happened and questions about 
the evaluative significance of what happened. This feature of the criminal 
jury—that the jury routinely decides normative questions—is frequently 
noted but is rarely examined. What does it exactly mean when we say that 
juries make normative determinations, and what is the nature of the in-
quiry that the jurors are engaging in when they consider moral questions 
in this particular setting? More specifically, this Article asks whether a 
juror, when making moral judgments, should follow his or her individual 
moral beliefs or identify and implement the community’s perspective. 
Many things said about the criminal jury appear to support the view that 
the jurors should attempt to replicate the community’s perspective. It is 
often said, for instance, the criminal jury serves as the community’s con-
science, representative, or fiduciary, and such formulations suggest an 
obligation on the part of the jurors to reproduce the community’s perspec-
tive. This Article argues that despite the popularity of such accounts, they 
are either too indeterminate to imply an obligation on the part of the ju-
rors to reproduce the community’s perspective, or in conflict with the fun-
damental obligation of jurors to adjudicate fairly and accurately. This Ar-
ticle, therefore, concludes that we are better off jettisoning the talk of the 
criminal jury as the community’s conscience, representative, or fiduciary, 
at least in this context, and should instead embrace the notion that jurors 
fulfill their roles in the criminal justice system most effectively when they 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Marcia Baron, Chad Flanders, Ste-
phen Galoob, Clare Huntington, Joshua Kleinfeld, Ethan Leib, Gabe Mendlow, Malcolm Thorburn, and partic-
ipants at Fordham Law School Faculty Workshop and at the Conference on Philosophical Perspectives on 
Criminal Procedure at Osgood Hall Law School for helpful comments. Finally, I would like to thank my hosts 
at the Law Department of LUISS Guido Carli in Rome, where much of the early work on the Article was done. 
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vote as individuals, not as representatives, by applying legal standards to 
particular situations and bringing a diversity of viewpoints to the task. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Was the sexual act consensual? Did the defendant have a reasonable be-
lief that he was in imminent danger of death by an attacker? Did the police use 
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excessive force? Did the defendant act in a heinous or cruel manner? Did the 
defendant act with depraved indifference to human life? 
These are some of the questions that criminal juries encounter. Determi-
nations of such questions involve a combination of factual and moral questions, 
both questions about what happened and questions about the evaluative signifi-
cance of what happened. This feature of the criminal jury—that the jury rou-
tinely decides normative questions—is frequently noted1 but raises many ques-
tions that have largely gone unanswered. What does it exactly mean when we 
say that juries make normative determinations, and what is the nature of the in-
quiry that the jurors are engaging in when they consider moral questions in this 
particular setting? 
To start thinking through these questions, consider the case of Owen La-
brie.2 Labrie, an eighteen-year-old male student in a high school in New Hamp-
shire, had a sexual encounter with a fifteen-year-old female student at the same 
school, though many of the facts are in dispute.3 The female student claimed 
that they had sex without her consent, whereas the male student said that they 
never had sex.4 Setting the facts aside for now, the most serious charge Labrie 
faced was aggravated felonious sexual assault, which provides, in relevant part, 
that “[a] person is guilty of the felony of aggravated sexual assault if such per-
son engages in sexual penetration with another person . . . when at the time of 
the sexual assault, the victim indicates by speech or conduct that there is not 
freely given consent to performance of the sexual act.”5 As to the mens rea re-
quirement of the statute, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted this 
provision as calling for the inquiry “whether a reasonable person in the circum-
stances would have understood that the victim did not consent.”6 
Now imagine two jurors in the case. After hearing all the evidence, the 
two jurors are in agreement that the two students had sex and that the female 
student “indicate[d] by speech or conduct that there is not freely given con-
sent.”7 But the jurors are in disagreement as to whether “a reasonable person in 
 
 1.  Darryl K. Brown, Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury In-
terpretation of Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1209 (1998) (“[T]he jury’s task is . . . to make indi-
vidualized moral judgments through application of indeterminate rules . . . .”); Michael T. Cahill, Punishment 
Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing the Jury as Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 102 (“[T]he jury 
has, and is meant to have, a significant normative role in applying—indeed, in effectively defining—broad and 
ambiguous legal standards that otherwise lack substantive content.”); George C. Christie, Judicial Review of 
Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 39–41 (1992) (distinguishing between questions that can be answered 
by “direct observation” and those that can be determined “only by reflection” and “exercise of judgment” “after 
all the evidence is in”); John T. Parry, The Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 
HOUS. L. REV. 397, 460 (1999) (“Indeed, the application of moral judgment appears to be an inevitable part of 
assessing and reconstructing facts and of interpreting and applying law—whether these tasks are performed by 
judge or jury.”). 
 2.  See Todd S. Purdum, St. Paul’s Before and After the Owen Labrie Rape Trial, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 
2016), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/03/st-pauls-owen-labrie-rape-trial. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 (2015). 
 6.  State v. Ayer, 612 A.2d 923, 926 (N.H. 1992). 
 7.  § 632-A:2. 
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the circumstances would have understood that the victim did not consent.”8 The 
first juror thinks that it was not unreasonable to fail to perceive the lack of con-
sent, but the second juror thinks that a reasonable person would have perceived 
the lack of consent. Furthermore, assume that the first juror’s view that it was 
not unreasonable to be mistaken about the lack of the female student’s consent 
was based on a widespread understanding of consent whereas the second ju-
ror’s view that a reasonable person would have perceived the absence of con-
sent is based on an understanding of consent that is more demanding of one’s 
ability to perceive such an absence than the understanding held by most people 
in the community. Should the second juror vote according to the more common 
view in the community, or should he stick to his opinion that the defendant’s 
failure to perceive the lack of consent was unreasonable? 
Consider also the case of Adrian Peterson, a professional football player 
who was charged under Texas law with the crime of “injury to a child” for 
beating his four-year-old son with a tree branch.9 “Injury to a child” in Texas is 
a crime that can range from negligent infliction of bodily injury to intentional 
infliction of serious bodily injury.10 Texas has a separate statute that governs 
the parent-child relationship, and it provides that “[t]he use of force . . . against 
a child . . . is justified . . . if the actor is the child’s parent . . . and when and to 
the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to discipline the 
child or to safeguard or promote his welfare.”11 
Again imagine two jurors in the case—or a potential child abuse case like 
it, involving corporal punishment of a child by his or her parent. After hearing 
all the evidence, the two jurors are in agreement about all the facts regarding 
what occurred but disagree as to whether what the parent did was justified. The 
first juror thinks that the parent reasonably believed that the force was neces-
sary and the second juror thinks that such a belief would be unreasonable. As-
sume also that the first juror’s view that the parent’s belief was reasonable is 
based on a widespread understanding in the community regarding the proper 
methods of parental discipline of children and that the second juror’s view that 
the belief was unreasonable is based on a minority perspective about appropri-
ateness of corporal punishment. Should the second juror vote according to the 
majority view of the community, or should she stick to her belief that the de-
fendant’s belief was unreasonable? 
This Article focuses on this issue of what question jurors are asked to an-
swer when they are asked to make moral judgments and proceeds as follows. 
As a preliminary matter, we first need to address the potential objection that the 
fact that there are moral terms in crime definitions does not necessarily mean 
that moral judgments must be made in applying the law. Even if it is the case 
 
 8.  See Ayer, 612 A.2d at 926. 
 9.  Steve Eder & Pat Borzi, N.F.L. Rocked Again as Adrian Peterson Faces a Child Abuse Charge, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/sports/football/adrian-peterson-indicted-on-
child-injury-charge.html. 
 10.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (West 2018). 
 11.  Id. § 9.61. 
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that crime definitions appear to have moral terms, is that not just an appear-
ance? Is it not possible that the terms are often defined by relevant lawmakers 
and that there is in fact very little room for moral reasoning by jurors? Part II 
describes this challenge and dismisses it but acknowledges the possibility that 
moral questions in the context of criminal adjudication are of a special type, 
namely about what the relevant community thinks about the issue. Then, we are 
back to the original questions raised by the examples raised above, and the rest 
of the Article addresses these. 
Parts III and IV start by considering answers that are tempting but are ul-
timately nonstarters. Part III considers the ubiquitous reasonable person test, 
which appears to call for identifying community norms instead of individual 
moral beliefs. Part III argues that while the reasonable person standard calls for 
factfinders to engage in a moral inquiry, it is inconclusive on the question of 
whether the relevant moral inquiry is, again, a special kind of moral inquiry in 
which a juror is to discern the community perspective. 
Part IV reviews various arguments in favor of viewing the moral inquiries 
jurors face as inquiries about the community perspective by considering the 
common view that jurors serve as the “community’s conscience,” are “commu-
nity representatives,” or are “fiduciaries” of the community. Part IV argues that 
while these views, too, imply that the jurors are to reproduce the community’s 
perspective on moral questions, such views are not only inconclusive on the is-
sue but also have normatively unattractive implications about the proper role of 
the criminal jury. 
The overall conclusion of Parts III and IV is that arguments about the na-
ture of the reasonable person test or arguments stemming from general descrip-
tions of the role of the criminal jury as conscience, representatives, or fiduciary 
do not answer the question posed about the nature of moral inquiry conducted 
by the criminal jury. Part V takes a different approach and gives direct argu-
ments, based on features of criminal law and punishment and notions of de-
mocracy, culpability, and fair notice, to believe that jurors ought to replicate the 
community perspective. 
Part VI presents the case against the view presented in Part V and argues 
that jurors should make moral judgments based on their individual beliefs as 
opposed to the beliefs held by the community by articulating the proper role of 
jurors in our criminal justice system. Part VI then revisits the arguments given 
in Part V, argues that the reasons given in Part V do not justify the view that 
jurors ought to replicate the community perspective, and shows the ways in 
which the concerns raised in Part V can be accommodated in the view that ju-
rors ought to vote according to their individual moral beliefs.12 
 
 12.  Before proceeding, let me address one potential objection to this project. It is fair to ask, in this age 
of vanishing trials, whether it makes sense to focus one’s scholarly efforts on jury trials in the criminal process. 
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011); Benjamin Weiser, Trial 
by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html. This Article assumes 
that, given the “archetype”-like status that the right to trial by jury has in our criminal justice system as a fun-
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II. JURORS AS FINDERS OF FACT: DO JURORS REALLY MAKE MORAL 
JUDGMENTS? 
There are several types of questions that jurors are tasked with in criminal 
trials, such as: “What crime was committed?,” “Did the defendant commit the 
crime?,” “What did the defendant do?,” and “Did the defendant’s actions con-
stitute a crime?” These questions overlap, but the reason they are phrased 
slightly differently is because sometimes it is clear that a crime was committed 
(a person was killed), and the question is whether the defendant can be linked 
to the crime (Was O.J. Simpson the killer?), whereas at other times there is lit-
tle dispute about whether the government has identified the correct defendant 
and the important questions that remain are exactly what the defendant did (Did 
Martha Stewart tamper with potential evidence?) and whether what the defend-
ant did constituted a crime and, if so, which crime (Did Dharun Ravi invade his 
roommate’s privacy, and if so, was there bias intimidation?). 
Deciding these cases requires reconstructing historical facts. Far more 
than that, however, is often involved in determining whether a person’s conduct 
met the definition of a crime. Terms like “reckless,” “without consent,” “de-
praved,” “grave,” “cruel,” “wanton,” “heinous,” “debased,” “perversion,” and 
“impair or debase the morals” are routine in criminal law. It is true that these 
terms would apply only if certain factual circumstances are present, which 
makes their applications depend heavily on findings of facts, but the terms have 
evaluative content. When two people disagree on whether a concept applies, 
the disagreement can be purely evaluative, in the sense that one’s normative 
attitude toward the thing can indicate whether the concept in question applies to 
the thing.13 For instance, two people can disagree on whether the term “reck-
 
damental constitutional commitment, it is important for scholars to work out the nature and scope of such 
commitments, even if the actual number of cases that go to trial is small. For a discussion of legal archetypes, 
see Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 
1723 (2005) (defining “archetype” as “a particular provision in a system of norms which has a significance 
going beyond its immediate normative content, a significance stemming from the fact that it sums up or makes 
vivid to us the point, purpose, principle, or policy of a whole area of law”). Moreover, even if it is the case that 
very few cases go to trial, how a criminal case is expected to be resolved at the end of the process can have an 
impact on the plea-bargaining process. Therefore, the fact that there are very few trials does not mean that trials 
are unimportant as a subject of study. 
 13.  These terms resemble what Bernard Williams has called “thick concepts.” BERNARD WILLIAMS, 
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140–41 (1985). Williams’s own examples were terms like “coward,” 
“lie,” “brutality,” and “gratitude.” Id. at 140. As Williams explains, thick concepts are “action-guiding” in the 
sense that they are “characteristically related to reasons for action,” as “[i]f a concept of this kind applies, this 
often provides someone with a reason for action.” Id. They are, however, called “thick” concepts because they 
are “thick” with descriptive attributes, which make the concepts “world-guided” as well as “action-guiding.” Id. 
at 141. Like the moral elements at issue in this Article, when two people disagree on whether a thick moral 
concept applies, the disagreement can be purely evaluative. See, e.g., Jonathan Dancy, In Defense of Thick 
Concepts, 20 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 263, 263 (1995) (“[W]ith the thick, evaluation partly determines descrip-
tion.”); Allan Gibbard, Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings, 66 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 
(SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUMES) 267, 275–77 (1992); T.M. Scanlon, Thickness and Theory, 100 J. PHIL. 275, 276 
(2003) (“In order to trace the contours of the ethical concept’s applicability we have to understand its evalua-
tive point.”). I am not the first to make this connection between thick concepts and certain legal concepts. See, 
e.g., R.A. Duff, Rule-Violations and Wrongdoing, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL 
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less” correctly applies to risk-taking because of their differing assessments as to 
whether the risk-taking was justifiable. Therefore, when applying crime defini-
tions to particular cases, different kinds of determinations must be made about 
historical facts—or questions about what happened—and about norms—or 
about the evaluative significance of what happened. Because of this feature of 
the criminal jury’s task, commentators have often observed that jurors “make 
individualized moral judgments.”14 
Just because many of these legal terms sound like moral terms, however, 
does not mean that deciding whether these elements are established necessarily 
involves moral reasoning. As Oliver Wendell Holmes warned us many years 
ago, the law is “full of phraseology drawn from morals,” which “continually 
invites us to pass from one domain to another without perceiving it,” but “noth-
ing is easier . . . than to take these words in their moral sense . . . and . . . to 
drop into fallacy.”15 The idea here is that the law is one thing and morality quite 
another, and the fact that the two systems share some of the same terminology 
should not lead us to forget the distinction between the two and “drop into fal-
lacy.”16 
If we take Holmes’s warning as our starting point, we might consider the 
possibility that all of these so-called moral terms have legal meanings deter-
mined by legislation and precedents and boiled down to specific jury instruc-
tions that spell out for jurors what facts are necessary and sufficient to find that 
these legal elements have been established. All that the jury has to do, accord-
ing to this view, is to see if the defendant’s conduct has features that satisfy the 
legal definitions of these terms, which leaves the jury very little room to engage 
in moral reasoning. 
Furthermore, the argument might go that, at least ever since Sparf v. Unit-
ed States was decided in 1895, it has been clear that jurors decide questions of 
fact and judges decide questions of law.17 When considering the distinction be-
tween law and fact, what moral elements contained in legal definitions cover 
seems to be more a question of law than a question of fact. In order to respect 
the division of labor between judges and juries, one might argue, we should 
understand the jurors’ task when considering moral elements to be mostly fac-
tual, not moral. And a way to confine the jurors’ task to fact-finding is for those 
who write the law to spell out what these moral terms in legal definitions mean 
and have jurors focus solely on the factual question of whether the relevant 
standards have been met. 
 
PART 47 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) [hereinafter Duff, Rule-Violations and Wrongdoing]; Da-
vid Enoch & Kevin Toh, Legal as a Thick Concept, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW 
257 (Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2013); Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (1994). 
 14.  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1, at 1209. 
 15.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1897). 
 16.  Id. at 460. 
 17. 156 U.S. 51, 106 (1895). There is historical evidence that juries had the power to decide questions of 
law at the time of the Founding. See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 67–88 (1994). 
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Moral reasoning does not go away so easily, however. It is true that mor-
alistic-sounding terms could give rise to highly technical, precise legal defini-
tions. But it is also often the case that vague and evaluative terms like “unjusti-
fiable,” “reasonable,” “depraved,” and “cruel” are not defined precisely.18 The 
terms can be defined precisely or not, and they are frequently applied to indi-
vidual cases by trial judges and juries without detailed guidance from appellate 
decisions and legislation.19 When defendants have complained that some of 
these terms need further specifications for the jury, courts have often rejected 
these challenges on the basis that the relevant term has a common, ordinary 
meaning that jurors can readily understand and apply.20 
In other words, notwithstanding Holmes’s admonition about not confus-
ing the ordinary meaning and technical meaning of terms, it appears that when 
such terms with common meanings are used in crime definitions, jurors are of-
ten asked to apply them using their ordinary understandings of these terms 
without the courts further specifying them. 
Does this argument establish then that the moral terms should be taken at 
face value and we should conclude that jurors are engaging in something like 
moral reasoning or moral judgment-making when they are applying these 
terms? That would be too quick a conclusion because it is possible that jurors 
understand, even without anybody saying so explicitly, that the same words can 
mean different things in different contexts, just by ordinary rules of interpreta-
tion. Everybody knows that saying something is “not fair” can mean different 
things depending on where the term is used—from playgrounds, schools, 
workplaces, business transactions, to the society at large. So when judges say 
that these terms have common, ordinary meanings that jurors can understand 
and apply, we can also assume that background rules of interpretation that can 
give different meanings to terms in different contexts remain in play. So, under 
ordinary rules of interpretation, what could these moral terms mean when they 
appear in crime definitions? 
Here is one suggestion. Perhaps every time we encounter a term like 
“reckless,” “without consent,” “depraved,” “grave,” and so on, in the legal con-
 
 18.  Sometimes, even technical terms that do not appear moralistic like “material” as in the crime of mis-
representing a “material fact,” can contain significant evaluative components. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 
U.S. 506, 509 (1995); Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Instructions, Defendant Culpability, and Jury Interpretation 
of Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 25, 33 (2002) (“Materiality . . . reveals whether the defendant’s state-
ments were mere technical, blameless violations, or to the contrary, whether they were important enough that 
they indicate his larger intent and even his motive and character.”); see also Brown, supra note 18 (“Willful-
ness . . . allows even an unreasonable belief to constitute a defense if it is honestly held by the defendant”). 
 19.  For a detailed discussion of the different ways in which courts deal with jurors’ interpretive discre-
tion, see generally Lawrence M. Solan, Jurors as Statutory Interpreters, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1281 (2003). 
 20.  See, e.g., State v. Chacon, 860 So. 2d 151, 153 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (“Mistreatment is equated with 
‘abuse’ and has a commonly understood meaning.”); People v. Biegajski, 332 N.W.2d 413, 418 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982) (pointing out that the word “torture” has “a common, ordinary meaning”); State v. VanVlack, 765 
P.2d 349, 351 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (“The term ‘consent’ does not have a technical meaning different from 
the commonly understood meaning. . . . Consequently the trial court was not required to instruct the jury on the 
definition of consent.”); see also State v. Blount, 770 P.2d 852, 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (“A person of com-
mon intelligence could readily understand what constitutes a lack of consent and . . . does not have to guess at 
the meaning of ‘lack of consent’ to determine whether one has acted in violation of the statute.”). 
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text, the question is not whether these terms apply to the facts in question di-
rectly, as in “conduct X was reckless” and “conduct X was without consent.” 
Rather, the question is whether the relevant community believes that “conduct 
X was reckless” and “conduct X was without consent.” Ronald Allen and Mi-
chael Pardo have made precisely such a suggestion.21 Allen and Pardo ask us 
to, for example, “[s]uppose that ‘negligence’ means the violation of community 
standards.”22 In that case, “what ‘negligence’ means is indeed a fact; it is the 
fact of the matter of what relevant community standards are.”23 If this is what 
these moral terms mean in the legal context, then it would be wrong to simply 
read the statute and say that the jury now has to decide whether “conduct X was 
reckless” or “conduct X was without consent.” The question that the jury has to 
answer is whether “conduct X is considered reckless by the community” or 
“conduct X is considered to be without consent by the community.” Is this a 
correct understanding of the juror’s role? Parts III and IV consider several 
tempting—though ultimately inconclusive—arguments in favor of this under-
standing. 
III. THE CASE OF THE REASONABLE PERSON 
One way to get at the question of whether jurors make moral judgments or 
simply report where a community stands on various questions is by looking at 
the terms “reasonable” and “unreasonable,” which frequently refer to the idea 
of a “reasonable person,” a ubiquitous legal standard that seems to explicitly 
call for jurors to find out what the community believes and then apply it. Both 
the Labrie case and the Peterson case mentioned in Part I implicated laws mak-
ing references to the “reasonable person” in the test of “whether a reasonable 
person in the circumstances would have understood that the victim did not con-
sent”24 (in the Labrie case) and the standard of “when and to the degree the 
[parent] reasonably believes the force is necessary to discipline the child or to 
safeguard or promote his welfare”25 (in the Peterson case). 
It is true that not all crime definitions with normative elements make a 
reference to reasonableness. Whatever conclusions are drawn in this Part, there-
fore, would be limited to laws that make use of the reasonable person test. At 
the same time, while it is beyond the scope of this Article to review all the 
ways in which the term “reasonable” is used in criminal law, the reasonable 
person is a large and complex topic, which resists truncated treatments. For the-
se reasons, the following discussion may strike some readers as a lengthy de-
tour. Given the prevalence of the reasonable person test and its powerful hold 
on the legal culture, however, we need to address the question of the reasonable 
person in order to deal with a large portion of jury judgments that have norma-
 
 21.  Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 
1792 (2002). 
 22.  Id. at 1790. 
 23.  Id. at 1790–91. 
 24.  State v. Ayer, 612 A.2d 923, 926 (N.H. 1992). 
 25.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.61 (West 2018). 
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tive components. Additionally, even in crime definitions that do not make an 
explicit reference to the reasonable person, there may be implicit references to 
the reasonable person. 
Here is a brief overview of uses of “reasonable.”26 First, “reasonableness” 
can be used to designate the proper level of concerns for others’ well-being 
when one engages in conduct.27 In New York, “recklessly” is defined as acting 
when the person is “aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and un-
justifiable risk” and the risk is “of such nature and degree that disregard thereof 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable per-
son would observe in the situation.”28 Similarly, “criminal negligence” is de-
fined as failing to “perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk” where the risk 
is “of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe 
in the situation.”29 Various offenses then make references to these terms, such 
as “reckless assault of a child” (“recklessly causes serious physical injury to the 
brain of a child less than five years old by shaking the child”);30 “assault in the 
second degree” (“recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by 
means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument”);31 “assault in the first 
degree” (“under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, 
he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another 
person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person”);32 “crim-
inally negligent homicide” (“with criminal negligence, he causes the death of 
another person”);33 “manslaughter in the second degree” (“recklessly causes the 
death of another person”);34 and “murder in the second degree” (“under cir-
cumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly en-
gages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and 
thereby causes the death of another person”).35 
In New York—which, like many states, follows the Model Penal Code’s 
culpability provisions with some modification—the formulations of “reckless-
ly” and “negligently” refer to a “substantial and unjustified risk,” where disre-
garding or failing to perceive that risk “constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”36 
The term “substantial” suggests that criminal law kicks in only in instances of 
 
 26.  For a helpful discussion, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness in and Out of Negligence Law, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2015); see also Marcia Baron, The Standard of the Reasonable Person in Criminal 
Law, in THE STRUCTURES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 12 (R.A. Duff et al., eds. 2011); Peter Westen, Two Rules of 
Legality in Criminal Law, 26 L. & PHIL. 229, 255 (2007). 
 27.  Cf. Zipursky, supra note 26, at 2160–65. 
 28.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 2018). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. § 120.02. 
 31.  Id. § 120.05. 
 32.  Id. § 120.10. 
 33.  Id. § 125.10. 
 34.  Id. § 125.15. 
 35.  Id. § 125.25. 
 36.  Id. § 15.05; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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risk-taking when the amount of risk exceeds a certain threshold level, whereas 
the term “unjustified” in this context asks whether the amount of risk taken is 
justified.37 The idea of an “unjustified” risk combines moral and epistemic con-
siderations, and it is brought out most obviously in the contrast between reck-
lessness and negligence. “Disregarding” a risk of, say, harm to others, implies 
indifference or lack of due concern for the well-being of others, whereas “fail-
ure to perceive” a risk indicates an epistemic failure. Of course, one may “dis-
regard” the risk of one’s being wrong about one thing or another, which we 
may classify as an epistemic failure, and one’s failure to perceive a risk may 
arise from indifference to others’ well-being, which would be a moral failure.38 
The Model Penal Code finesses all of these considerations by referring to “the 
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation,” 
thereby making “reasonable” do much of the work.39 
Second, the term “reasonable” is sometimes used to invoke a level of 
soundness in judgment and is synonymous with sound, prudent, or sensible.40 
This understanding of reasonableness, at issue in the Adrian Peterson case men-
tioned above, is identified most easily in situations when a person is performing 
a task, and the nature of the job is such that it demands a series of judgments. In 
New York, the term “reasonable” is used to designate situations where transit 
conductors and physicians and nurses may use force to the extent that they 
“reasonably” believe it to be necessary.41 New York has a provision to deal 
with corporal punishment, as it permits “[a] parent, guardian or other person 
entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-
one . . . [to] use physical force . . . upon such person when and to the extent that 
he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the 
welfare of such person.”42 Similar provisions on corporal punishment can be 
found in a number of states, including Texas as before mentioned, where Peter-
son’s corporal punishment case was adjudicated.43 
Third, the term “reasonable” is used as a way of indicating epistemic jus-
tifiability.44 New York, for instance, allows infliction of physical force upon 
another person where “he . . . reasonably believes such to be necessary to de-
fend himself . . . from what he . . . reasonably believes to be the use or immi-
nent use of unlawful physical force by such other person.”45 And in California, 
self-defense requires an actual and reasonable belief that one’s life is in danger, 
 
 37.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 2018). 
 38.  See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 163 (1990). 
 39.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 40.  Reasonable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/reasonable (last vis-
ited May 31, 2018). 
 41.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.6 (West 2018); Doriane Lambelet Coleman et al., Where and How to 
Draw the Line Between Reasonable Corporal Punishment and Abuse, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 118 
(2010). 
 44.  Cf. Zipursky, supra note 26, at 2140–41. 
 45.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10. 
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where “reasonable belief” is defined in terms of “a reasonable man” having 
“sufficient grounds for his belief.”46 As we saw above in the Labrie case, the 
term “reasonableness” also makes an appearance in sex offense definition as to 
the defendant’s state of mind with regard to the victim’s consent.47 In New 
York, “rape in the third degree” is defined as “engag[ing] in sexual intercourse 
with another person without such person’s consent,” where “lack of consent” is 
defined as a situation where “the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not 
consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor’s situation 
would have understood such person’s words and acts as an expression of lack 
of consent to such act under all the circumstances.”48 In Tennessee, when “sex-
ual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the de-
fendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the vic-
tim did not consent,” a crime of rape is committed.49 In this context, 
“reasonable” is a way of addressing situations of mistakes of fact, and “reason-
able” is used to indicate epistemic justifiability. 
Fourth, the term “reasonable” is used to designate situations in which 
one’s loss of self-possession is excusable or partially excusable in doctrines of 
duress and provocation. In New York, it is an affirmative defense that a person 
“engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use 
or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third per-
son, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situ-
ation would have been unable to resist.”50 In Georgia, voluntary manslaughter 
is defined as homicide “which would otherwise be murder . . . if he acts solely 
as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious 
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.”51 In these 
examples, unlike mistakes of perception that are nevertheless epistemically jus-
tifiable, the term “reasonable” indicates reasonable failures of reason. What 
makes failures of reason due to anger or fear reasonable is that even reasonable 
people, when facing certain extreme situations, could lose control over their 
everyday faculties that otherwise enable them to live as law-abiding, responsi-
ble citizens.52 
The usual caveats apply, of course. The four categories are neither ex-
haustive nor mutually exclusive.53 There are overlaps, and instead of thinking 
 
 46.  People v. Williams, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-1-704 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4 (West 2018); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22. See generally 
Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 367, 378–79 n.27 (1996). 
 47.  See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.05, 130.25. 
 48.  Id. For other states with similar provisions, see Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: 
Anatomy of a Rape, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 273–74 (2002). 
 49.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (West 2018). 
 50.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00. 
 51.  GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (West 2018). 
 52.  R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 295 
(2007) [hereinafter DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME]. See generally R.A. Duff, Criminal Responsibility and the 
Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?, 58 INQUIRY 189 (2015). 
 53.  For other uses of reasonableness, see Zipursky, supra note 26, at 2138–42. 
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of these as different categories, we may instead think of them as different di-
mensions of reasonableness where different dimensions are prominently dis-
played in different contexts. What the four categories have in common is that 
they have all been subject to the basic tension that runs through the idea of rea-
sonableness. 
This basic tension is well-known. The term “reasonable person” is some-
times understood to mean “typical person,” “average person,” or “ordinary per-
son”—all phrases that suggest the method of imagining an ordinary member of 
the community and asking what such a person would have believed, would 
have perceived, would have thought, and so on, in the relevant circumstances.54 
The term “reasonable,” by contrast, seems to have something to do with having 
reasons, being sound and sensible. The two readings are in tension because a 
reasonable person may find oneself surrounded and outnumbered by unreason-
able people, and in such a group, an ordinary person would not be so reasona-
ble.55 In this respect, it is instructive to note that some states use the phrase “or-
dinary person,” not “reasonable person,” in their criminal codes.56 Courts also 
sometimes use “ordinary person,” though in some of those cases, the idea of 
“reasonableness” comes back in through terms like “prudent.”57 
Sometimes the two different meanings of “reasonableness” are described 
as the contrast between “descriptive” (or “positive”) and “normative.”58 This 
framing is understandable given that identifying what an ordinary person would 
think about this or that sounds like a descriptive inquiry, whereas determining 
what is “reasonable” sounds normative. Characterizing the contrast between 
“ordinary” and “reasonable” as that between descriptive and normative, how-
ever, can be misleading. As the four types of situations stated above make 
clear, it is difficult to escape normative assessments when discussing the rea-
sonable person. Showing proper concern for others and displaying sound judg-
 
 54.  John Gardner, The Many Faces of the Reasonable Person, 131 L.Q. REV. 563, 575 (2015) (describ-
ing the view where a juror is supposed to determine “not whether a certain action, belief, decision etc. was jus-
tified but whether people, or some people would in her judgment think it was justified”). 
 55.  As John Gardner puts it, “the average Joe [may not be] as reasonable as all that.” Id. at 572. 
 56.  See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (2018); N.M. STAT. § 30-2-3 (West 2018); N.M. UNIF. CRIM. JURY 
INSTR. 14-222 (“The provocation must be such as would affect the ability to reason and to cause a temporary 
loss of self-control in an ordinary person of average disposition.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.75 (West 2006); 
TENN. STAT. § 39-11-302 (West 2018) (“The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circum-
stances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03 (West 2018); UTAH 
CODE § 76-2-103 (West 2018). 
 57.  State v. Henson, 197 P.3d 456, 463 (Kan. 2008); State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505, 513 (Mo. 1999). 
California’s definition of negligence refers to “a prudent man” and the kind of care he “ordinarily bestows.” 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 2018). Texas has a separate provision for “reasonable belief,” and it refers to “an 
ordinary and prudent man.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07; Williams v. State, 630 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1982); see also Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 432–34 (1982); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: 
Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 973 n.65 (2002). 
 58.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 46, at 495 (“Jurisdictions utilizing an objective or hybrid subjectivized-
objective standard of reasonableness currently employ what I call a positivist model of reasonableness. By 
positivist, I mean that the model is descriptive rather than normative.”); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The 
Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324 (2012). 
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ment when engaging in certain tasks—the first and second categories above—
obviously implicate normative issues. Though not as obvious and perhaps more 
controversial, reasonableness as to epistemic justifiability involves normative 
concerns, as a person’s factual perceptions—such as whether a person consent-
ed to sex—can be influenced by values that one holds in myriad ways.59 Final-
ly, reasonableness in the context of duress or provocation also sets a standard of 
courage or equanimity that society expects of its citizens.60 But does all this 
mean that the debate between “descriptive” and “normative” understandings of 
the reasonable person has a clear winner, the winner being the “normative” un-
derstanding? 
The answer is no. It is true that the reasonable person standard may be 
normative in that it is used to set a standard of behavior, and it may even be the 
case that the standard is used to evaluate how well a person has normatively as-
sessed the situation in which he has found himself. At the same time, the actual 
content of the reasonable person may be given by asking what an ordinary per-
son in a given situation would do, which may be done descriptively. What we 
are interested in for the purposes of this Article are situations where the term 
“reasonable” is used as a standard to judge how a person has perceived or acted 
in a situation calling for a combination of factual and normative assessments. 
One way of going about such a judgment is by asking how an ordinary person 
would have perceived or acted in such a situation; another way is by asking 
how a reasonable person would have perceived or acted.61 
The ordinary-reasonable controversy has been with us for quite some 
time, and the most frequently cited example is the case of Bernhard Goetz, who 
was prosecuted “for having shot and wounded four youths on a New York City 
subway train after one or two of the youths approached him and asked for 
$5.”62 Goetz testified that he “knew” from the facial expression of one of them 
that they wanted to “play” with him and that “he had a fear, based on prior ex-
periences, of being ‘maimed.’”63 Goetz was white, and “the four youths” were 
young black men. Whether Goetz was justified in shooting at them in order to 
defend himself turned on the question of whether he “reasonably” believed that 
he was in imminent danger of being subject to deadly force by them.64 The 
question of whether the “reasonableness” element requires that the jurors apply 
the standard of an “ordinary person” or a “reasonable person” is implicated in 
 
 59.  See, e.g., DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, supra note 52, at 292–96 (2007); Stephen P. Garvey, Self-
Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 119, 124 n.28 (2008); Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cogni-
tion, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 731 
(2010); Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1, 20 (2008); Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 
144 (2008). See generally MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 
(2009). 
 60.  Duff, Rule-Violations and Wrongdoing, supra note 13, at 63. 
 61.  Gardner, supra note 54, at 574 (formulating the dilemma as between “what the average Joe round 
these parts would believe” and “what a genuinely reasonable person would believe”). 
 62.  People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 99 (N.Y. 1986). 
 63.  Id. at 101. 
 64.  Id. at 106. 
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this case—it is commonly understood—because it seems easy to reach the con-
clusion of “reasonableness” in this context if one pictures an “ordinary person,” 
as one could assume that an ordinary person harbors prejudice against black 
men.65 If one’s starting point is that of a “reasonable person,” reaching the con-
clusion of “reasonableness,” by contrast, is not as straightforward given that it 
seems to require endorsing the view that racial prejudice is reasonable. In short, 
racial prejudice may be ordinary but not reasonable. 
Legal scholars commenting on the Goetz case have generally argued in 
favor of the view that “the reasonable person” does not mean a typical, average, 
or ordinary person but means a “reasonable person.”66 Jody Armour has ar-
gued, for instance, “[i]f we accept that racial discrimination violates contempo-
rary social morality, then an actor’s failure to overcome his racism for the sake 
of another’s health, safety, and personal dignity is blameworthy and thus unrea-
sonable, independent of whether or not it is ‘typical.’”67 Cynthia Lee, similarly, 
has argued that “[i]nterpreting reasonableness as a function of typicality is 
problematic because it permits racial stereotypes to have too great an influence 
on juror determinations in self-defense cases.”68 
More generally speaking, outside the context of the Goetz case, Mayo 
Moran’s book Rethinking the Reasonable Person argues against treating “rea-
sonable” as “ordinary” and extensively documents the ways in which conflating 
the two ends up “counting widely shared mistakes as ‘reasonable.’”69 Peter 
Westen has also argued that “‘reasonableness’ is not an empirical or statistical 
measure of how average members of the public think, feel, or behave” but is 
rather “a normative measure of ways in which it is right for persons to think, 
feel, or behave—or, at the very least, ways in which it is not wrong for them to 
do so.”70 Marcia Baron also urges judges to “bear in mind” that “what is ordi-
nary, or customary, or ‘normal’ is of limited relevance to the issue of whether a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances might have acted as the de-
fendant did.”71 
If these commentators are right, what would that imply about the question 
we have been asking? If “the reasonable person” is equivalent to “the ordinary 
person,” then the jurors would be tasked with identifying the ordinary person 
and describing how he or she would think and behave. But if, as these commen-
tators argue, “the reasonable person” is not the same as “the ordinary person,” 
and the idea of “the reasonable person” is normative, then does that mean each 
 
 65.  Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary 
Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 788 (1994); Garvey, supra note 59, at 128, n.34 (collecting social science 
studies documenting the ways in which people’s perceptions of potential threats they face depend on racial 
factors). 
 66.  Armour, supra note 65, at 805; see also Lee, supra note 46, at 495. 
 67.  See Armour, supra note 66, at 788, 790; Lee, supra note 46, at 495. 
 68.  Lee, supra note 46, at 496. 
 69.  MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
OBJECTIVE STANDARD 14 (2003). 
 70.  Westen, supra note 59, at 138. 
 71.  Baron, supra note 26, at 30. 
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juror should ask what he or she personally thinks it would be reasonable to do 
in relevant circumstances? 
Not necessarily. Consider, for instance, the view recently defended by 
Saira Mohamed that the law’s choice not to equate reasonableness with ordi-
nariness is indicative of criminal law’s attempt to “set[] out aspirational stand-
ards.”72 Under this account, “reasonableness” designates how people ought to 
think and behave.73 And on that question of what people ought to aspire to, 
there may be a difference between what an individual juror thinks and what the 
community at large thinks. What “the community” aspires to might not be 
equivalent to what an ordinary person aspires to because “the community” 
might aspire to something higher and more commendable than what the ordi-
nary person aspires to (and vice versa). Thus, just because the normative read-
ing of “reasonableness” is correct, this does not necessarily mean that the jurors 
ought to make normative judgments based on individual normative views. It 
may still be the case that they ought to attempt to reproduce the community’s 
perspective on “reasonableness.” 
So, where do we end up? It appears that looking at the reasonable person 
test closely does not answer the question as to what jurors ought to be doing in 
dealing with moral questions. Perhaps instead of approaching the question 
through the debates surrounding the reasonable person test, we might look 
more closely at the ways in which people talk about jurors and how they fit into 
our judicial system. 
IV. JURORS AS THE CONSCIENCE, REPRESENTATIVES, OR FIDUCIARIES OF THE 
COMMUNITY 
A. How Jurors May Represent 
It turns out that there are a number of reasons to justify the belief that the 
jury’s job is to inquire into what the relevant community believes—criminal 
jurors are often described as the community’s conscience, representatives or 
fiduciaries of the community. Below is an overview of those reasons. 
1. Conscience of the Community 
The jury’s position in the legal system is often described as acting as “the 
conscience of the community” by, among others, the Supreme Court. For in-
stance, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court noted that “a jury that must choose 
between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more—and 
must do nothing less—than express the conscience of the community on the ul-
timate question of life or death.”74 The Court also observed that “one of the 
 
 72.  Saira Mohamed, Deviance, Aspiration, and the Stories We Tell: Reconciling Mass Atrocity and the 
Criminal Law, 124 YALE L.J. 1628, 1676 (2015). 
 73.  Id. at 1636. 
 74. 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968). 
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most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to 
maintain a link between community values and the penal system—a link with-
out which the determination of punishment would hardly reflect the ‘evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”75 Since 
then, the phrase “the conscience of the community” has been used a number of 
times by the Court to describe the jury’s task in the death penalty context,76 and 
it is explicitly invoked by lawyers in jury trials as well.77 
Numerous scholars who have written in praise of the criminal jury have 
also often invoked the notion of “the community.” Jeffrey Abramson, for in-
stance, states that the jury historically “was our best assurance that law and jus-
tice accurately reflected the morals, values, and common sense of the people 
asked to obey the law,”78 describes “the political function” of the jury as 
“bringing community norms to bear on the law,”79 and justifies “the cross-
sectional composition of the jury” because it “underwrites the democratic au-
thority of that jury to locate through deliberation what that community’s local 
norms are in that case.”80 Rachel Barkow has similarly described the jury as 
offering a “unique perspective to the criminal justice system: the views of the 
community,”81 and has argued that “[t]he jury possesses the power to elaborate 
the governing norms underlying criminal law from the perspective of the com-
munity and its sense of moral blameworthiness.”82 Barkow has also argued that 
“the Framing generation” believed that “the purpose of the jury was to inject 
the common-sense view of the community into a criminal proceeding.”83 These 
are only a few of many examples of scholars who hold similar views about the 
jury.84 
 
 75.  Id. at 519 n.15. 
 76.  See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (“[T]he Government has a strong interest 
in having the jury express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death”); 
Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 458 U.S. 909, 912 (1988) (“As we have previously recognized, the function of the sen-
tencing jury is to ‘express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.’”); Low-
enfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238 (1988) (noting the state’s “strong interest in having the jury ‘express the 
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.’”). 
 77.  See James Joseph Duane, What Messages Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask Them to 
“Send a Message” with Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 576 n.29 (1995). 
 78.  ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 28; see also Cahill, supra note 1, at 103 (“The jury’s normative, fault-
finding function has been supported . . . on its own terms, based on the capacity of a lay jury to express com-
munity norms . . . .”). 
 79.  Jeffrey Abramson, Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 739, 785 (2014) 
[hereinafter Abramson, Second-Order]. 
 80.  Id. at 783. 
 81.  Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Man-
datory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 77 (2003). 
 82.  Id. at 59; see also PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 160 (1956) (arguing that a trial by jury provides 
“insurance that the criminal law will conform to the ordinary man’s idea of what is fair and just”). 
 83.  Barkow, supra note 81, at 58–59. 
 84.  See e.g., NEIL VIDMAR &VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 225 (2007) (“The jury 
channels the community’s political views within the rule of law.”); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-
Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1361, 1401 (2003); Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 687 (2012) 
(“[J]urors draw their power not from their ability to parse facts but from their ability to represent the communi-
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Such invocations of the “community” suggest that the jury’s function in 
the system is to provide the perspective of the community and that individual 
jurors should in turn feel obligated to discern such a perspective as they consid-
er their cases. An implication one may draw from this picture is that jurors do 
not “directly” answer moral questions even when they are applying crime defi-
nitions with heavily moral components. Rather, they are to answer moral ques-
tions by turning to what the relevant community thinks about such moral is-
sues. 
2. Jurors as Representatives 
Jurors are sometimes also described as “community representatives”85 or 
as “standing for” or “standing in for” the relevant community.86 As Hélène 
Landemore, a democratic theorist, puts it in terms that are familiar, 
“[r]epresentatives are supposed to take into account their constituents’ interests 
and judgments, not act and decide entirely on their own.”87 If so, the idea of 
representation suggests, again, that jurors are to find out where the community 
overall would stand on a given moral question and vote accordingly, as op-
posed to making their own moral judgments. 
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3. Jurors as Fiduciaries 
In a similar vein, in a recent article, Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 
Ethan Leib, Michael Serota, and David Ponet propose that we view jurors as 
fiduciaries who are obligated to advance the interests of “the people.”88 The au-
thors go on to argue that jurors, as fiduciaries, owe a duty of loyalty to the peo-
ple and that the practice of jury nullification can be explained as a device that 
jurors use to “channel loyalty to the public interest—by conforming to the ethi-
cal intuitions of the people” and to communicate, as “citizen representatives,” 
“popular judgments on the existing laws.”89 Again, a likely implication of such 
a view is that jurors have an obligation to produce decisions that “conform[] to 
the ethical intuitions of the people,” which supports the view that jurors do not 
answer moral questions but rather have an obligation to reproduce moral views 
held by “the community” or “the people.”90 
B. Do Jurors Represent? 
So the idea of jurors as the conscience, representatives, and fiduciaries 
suggests an answer to the question this Article has raised. But it turns out, upon 
closer scrutiny, that these theories do not compel an answer one way or another 
on the question of whether jurors should vote according to individual moral be-
liefs or the community’s perspective. In order to see why, we need a more de-
tailed look at the idea of representation, which, while being only one of the 
three ideas mentioned above, is broad enough to encompass the idea of the 
criminal jury as the conscience or a fiduciary as well. And when we take such a 
look, we can see that the term “representation” is used in a number of different 
ways, as shown in Hanna Pitkin’s 1967 book, which remains the starting point 
of any discussion regarding the nature of political representation today.91 When 
we, in turn, look at different ideas of representation, we will also see that they 
are too limited, inapplicable, indeterminate, or problematic to offer a viable an-
swer to the question we are interested in. 
1. Representatives as Agents Who Can Bind Principals 
Jurors may be considered “representatives” of the relevant community in 
the sense that “anyone who performs a function for [a] group” is the group’s 
representative if his “actions may be attributed to [the group] and are binding 
on it.”92 But this characterization tells us only what consequences follow from 
acts of representing and does not tell us much about what the jurors ought to do 
 
 88.  Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2014) [hereinafter Leib et al., Fiduciary Principles]. 
 89.  Id. at 1137. 
 90. Id. 
 91.  See generally HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). 
 92.  Id. at 41. 
  
1274 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
and how they ought to conceive of their role. It is thus too limited in scope to 
be helpful for our purposes. 
2. Authorization by and Accountability to Constituents 
Are jurors representatives in the way legislators are representatives? It 
does not seem that way. Jurors are not elected like legislators or otherwise au-
thorized directly by the citizens to act on their behalf, which is one way a per-
son represents another person.93 Nor are they held “accountable” to those they 
supposedly “represent” in the sense of being “held to account” or required to 
“answer to” those they represent, as jurors do not face reelection or potential 
termination for reaching a decision their “constituents” do not like.94 To be 
sure, jurors are authorized by law to serve as jurors and are accountable to the 
legal system, itself represented by the presiding judge, to do their job, but they 
are not authorized by or accountable to specific persons. 
In fact, it is fair to describe the criminal jury as an entity specifically de-
signed so that they would not be held accountable or answer to those they “rep-
resent,” whoever they may be. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), for instance, 
prohibits jurors from “testify[ing] about any statement made or incident that 
occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s 
vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.”95 
The oft-stated policy behind the rule, as articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Tanner v. United States, is to ensure that “the jury system . . . survive[s]” and to 
preserve “full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to re-
turn an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on 
the decisions of laypeople.”96 
The Tanner Court considered the need to protect the jury deliberation 
process to be so important that it was willing to let a jury verdict go unchal-
lenged despite evidence that, during trial and deliberation, “four male jurors 
 
 93.  Id. at 42–44. 
 94.  Id. at 55; see also Mark E. Warren, Citizen Representatives, in DESIGNING DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 50, 57–59 (Mark E. Warren & Hilary Pearse eds., 2008); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND 
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The representative acts on his or her own, but in anticipation of having to give an account to those he or she 
represents.”); Mark B. Brown, Citizen Panels and the Concept of Representation, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 203, 221 
(2006). 
 95.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
 96.  483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987); see also id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing “freedom of delibera-
tion, finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against harassment” as the purposes behind the rule). As the 
Supreme Court recently explained in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, all American jurisdictions have some ver-
sion of the same rule, though several have exceptions to it to allow testimonies about various improprieties 
during jury deliberation, including expressions of racial bias. 137 S. Ct. 855, 878 (2017). The Court held that: 
[W]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates that he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus 
to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in 
order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of 
the jury trial guarantee. 
Id. While Pena-Rodriguez’s holding is important and cracks open the door to the jury room somewhat, such 
limited exceptions do not threaten the observation made here about the criminal jury’s general lack of account-
ability. 
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shared up to three pitchers of beer” and “smoked marijuana” on a daily basis, 
two of them ingested “cocaine . . . on several occasions,” one male juror “used 
cocaine during breaks,” a female juror would drink “a liter of wine at lunch,” 
and two other female jurors “regularly consumed one or two mixed drinks at 
lunch.”97 In addition, special verdicts are disfavored in criminal jury trials98 and 
inconsistent verdicts are allowed99—both positions defended by the need to 
keep jurors in criminal trials free from outside scrutiny.100 Therefore, when it is 
said that jurors “represent” the community, the relevant idea of representation 
is not the kind that holds jurors accountable. Specifying the idea of representa-
tion in terms of authorization or accountability accordingly does not help, as 
that particular specification does not fit our jury practice. 
3. Descriptive Representation 
Another reading of the term “representation” in the context of the jury 
may be that a jury is supposed to “represent” by being a microcosm or a “repre-
sentative sample” of the relevant community.101 According to Pitkin’s theory of 
“descriptive representation,” the key requirements for the jury to be a good rep-
resentative are “resemblance, reflection, [and] accurate correspondence.”102 
Under this view, the jury exists as a way of producing a verdict that the entire 
community would present if it were there to hear the case, as its function is to 
accurately reflect the community’s perspective. 
There is some support for this way of thinking about juries. For instance, 
Taylor v. Louisiana, which held that criminal juries “must be drawn from a 
source fairly representative of the community,” seems to envision criminal ju-
ries as charged with reflecting the community’s perspective.103 An extreme ver-
sion of this perspective among legal scholars can be found in an article by 
George Thomas and Barry Pollack in which they assume for the purposes of 
their analysis that “‘true’ guilt means nothing more, or less, than the judgment 
that society as a whole would reach in a given case” as they evaluate criminal 
juries and their decisions.104 
As appealing as this idea of representation may be, it does not answer the 
question we are interested in—namely, the nature of the proper task for each 
juror.105 If the purpose of the jury is to arrive at the “judgment that society as a 
 
 97.  Tanner, 483 U.S. at 136 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 98.  United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 183 (1st Cir. 1969). 
 99.  United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 (1984). 
 100.  Id. at 69; Spock, 416 F.2d at 182. 
 101.  Spock, 416 F.2d at 181 n.39. 
 102.  PITKIN, supra note 91, at 62. 
 103.  419 U.S. 522, 530, 538 (1975). 
 104.  George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 9 (1992); cf. PITKIN, supra note 91, at 84 (“Representing may be seen as an accurate correspondence be-
tween legislature and nation . . . to ensure that the legislature does what the people themselves would have done 
if they acted directly.”). 
 105.  Moreover, as has been pointed out many times, as a descriptive matter, there are serious problems 
with the idea of the jury mirroring or resembling the community. For one thing, the Taylor Court left no ambi-
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whole would reach in a given case,” does it follow that each juror should at-
tempt to arrive at such a judgment? Or does the system essentially depend on 
some hope that the jury would end up mirroring the broader society if each in-
dividual juror voted according to his or her personal judgment? This way of 
thinking about representation also introduces a third possibility, which is, as 
Pitkin puts it, that “a representative . . . must reflect his constituents as truly and 
accurately as possible,”106 where “constituents” might mean a particular group 
defined in terms of, say, race, gender, or class.107 This third possibility suggests 
that jurors may see themselves as having “constituents” and should represent 
“the black perspective,” “the female perspective,” “the urban poor perspective,” 
and so on.108 The idea of descriptive representation seems consistent with all 
three possibilities and is thus too indeterminate to render an answer to the ques-
tion in which we are interested. 
4. Jurors as Fiduciaries 
Pitkin remarks that “[r]epresentation certainly is, as many writers have 
pointed out, a fiduciary relationship, involving trust and obligation on both 
sides.”109 Can the “fiduciary” notion illuminate the question on the table? As 
mentioned above, Leib, Serota, and Ponet have suggested as much. They have 
defended the view that we conceive of jurors as fiduciaries and, as noted above, 
have argued that the practice of jury nullification can be explained as a device 
that jurors use to “channel loyalty to the public interest by conforming to the 
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ethical intuitions of the people,”110 which in turn implies an obligation to re-
produce moral views held by the community. 
But what does the term “fiduciary” mean? One suggestion may be to 
think, as Pitkin describes the view at one point, that “the representative must do 
what his principal would do, must act as if the principal himself were act-
ing.”111 Under this description, jurors ought to attempt to approximate what the 
relevant community would wish to do. But that conclusion is not required by 
the idea of representation, as illustrated by the traditional debate over whether a 
good representative does what the represented wants or does what is good for 
the represented.112 Sometimes a good representative does what is in the benefi-
ciary’s interest but is not necessarily what the beneficiary would wish. 
Pitkin’s own solution is that we stop asking “whether the representative 
ought to act in his constituents’ interest as he sees it or as they see it” and simp-
ly recognize that he “must act in their interest, period.”113 She later proposes a 
formulation that includes the thoughts that “representing . . . means acting in 
the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” and that the 
representative’s “action must involve discretion and judgment.”114 
What would all this mean in the jury context? Here, I focus on Leib, Sero-
ta, and Ponet’s recent article on the jury as it is the most developed account of 
the jury and jurors as fiduciaries. Leib, Serota, and Ponet start from the obser-
vation that there are multiple possibilities when assigning the fiduciary-
beneficiary designations to different actors in a jury system.115 Each juror or 
each jury could be a fiduciary.116 And possible beneficiaries, they mention, are 
“‘the law’ or the ‘legal system’ or ‘the state’; one or the other or both of the lit-
igants; or ‘the people.’”117 They settle on the answer that “both the individual 
juror and the petit jury as a whole are fiduciaries for ‘the people.’”118 
What follows from the proposition that the criminal jury is a fiduciary for 
the people? That formulation by itself does not tell us much about how jurors 
ought to approach their tasks. Of course, to the extent that the legal system is 
there to serve “the people,” there is nothing wrong with the idea that the judici-
ary, by extension, exists to serve “the people” as well. In fact, every public of-
ficial, including a juror, can be described as a “representative” of “the people” 
with various fiduciary obligations. Moreover, that state institutions and state 
officials exist for “the people” is not an idea unique to democracy. Consider 
this quote from Edmund Burke: “The king is the representative of the people; 
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so are the lords; so are the judges. They are all trustees for the people.”119 It is 
true that positing the people as the beneficiary does rule out certain visions of 
the government—say a person believes that the government exists to enrich the 
President and his family or benefit the wealthy few but no one else—but other 
than ruling out such obvious nonstarters, its implications are highly indetermi-
nate. So, if the question we are asking is what obligations legislators, prosecu-
tors, judges, and jurors have in a society, saying that they all “represent the 
people” and have various fiduciary obligations to them does not advance the 
inquiry sufficiently far to reach the question that we have been addressing. 
That is not quite fair, though, to Leib, Serota, and Ponet, as the three au-
thors (though sometimes just Leib and Ponet) have given the idea of being a 
fiduciary more content over the years. The theory they present is rich and mul-
tifaceted, so I will focus only on the aspect that seems most relevant to the topic 
of this Article. Consider one of the central features of the authors’ fiduciary 
theory: deliberative engagement.120 The authors have argued over the years that 
within “the core of the constellation of fiduciary duties in fiduciary political 
representation” lies a “dialogic imperative” that they call “deliberative en-
gagement.”121 What does “deliberative engagement” call for? Leib, Serota, and 
Ponet define it as “an affirmative obligation to engage in dialogue with the pub-
lic fiduciary’s beneficiary.”122 One implication of this obligation is that “it is 
the fiduciary representative’s job to try to divine a coherent public will,”123 as 
the “duty requires an authentic effort to uncover . . . their beneficiaries’ prefer-
ences.”124 Like the idea of the jury being the community’s conscience, these 
references to the “public will” or the people’s “preferences” seem to suggest a 
bias in favor of identifying the community’s perspective on moral questions 
and implementing it. 
However, as Leib, Serota, and Ponet acknowledge, “many well-
established features of the jury system”—such as instructions not to discuss the 
case during trial or to do independent research—“seem in tension with the pub-
lic fiduciary’s duty of deliberative engagement.”125 In fact, when we look at 
different functions that criminal procedure rules play in the United States, espe-
cially given its history of racial subordination and violence, one of the most 
important functions is that they serve as a barrier that stands between mob vio-
lence and the rule of law.126 Presumption of innocence, the proof beyond a rea-
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sonable doubt requirement, the right to counsel, prohibitions on ex post facto 
laws, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishments, and so on serve, among 
other things, as safeguards to ensure that each criminal defendant is treated fair-
ly, even if doing so can interfere with convicting the guilty and even if there 
may be enormous pressures from the people to convict and punish those whom 
the public sees, correctly or incorrectly, as wrongdoers. Given such features of 
criminal procedures, it seems in fact the case that jurors should not understand 
their job to “require[] an authentic effort to uncover . . . their beneficiaries’ 
preferences.”127 
Given all this, it is understandable why Leib, Serota, and Ponet call for “a 
modified duty of deliberative engagement, calibrated according to the particu-
larities of jury representation.”128 Furthermore, it is instructive that when Leib, 
Serota, and Ponet discuss jury nullification, the identity of the beneficiary is re-
ferred to neither as “the people” nor “the public” but as “the public interest,” as 
in “[w]hen a jury’s decision emanates from jurors’ commitment to being loyal 
to the public interest” and “the act of jury nullification may channel loyalty to 
the public interest.”129 The difference is subtle, but the phrase “public interest” 
takes the focus away from “the people” or even from “the public” and places it 
on the question of what is good for society overall, which may call for ignoring 
what the people wish on a given day. 
What does all this mean for the question that we are interested in, which is 
whether jurors ought to attempt to replicate the community’s perspective? To 
answer, we might picture the relevant relationships as follows: The people au-
thorize the legal system to administer law in order to serve the people; the legal 
system assigns roles to different parts of the system in order to serve the peo-
ple; those roles, however, do not necessarily make direct references to the peo-
ple because sometimes, in order to serve the people most effectively, one may 
have to put blinders on and ignore the people. 
The upshot of all this, for our purposes, is not necessarily that jurors do 
not “serve the people” or “represent” the community or that they are not 
“community representatives.” There is a sense in which they are clearly repre-
sentatives of the community. Neither is the point that theories that posit jurors 
as fiduciaries are deficient; it is clear that such theories have resources to deal 
with some of the problems raised by building in various obligations the fiduci-
ary has. For instance, just as Leib, Serota, and Ponet have said about judges, 
they could respond to my concerns by saying that jurors “serve the people” by 
“[d]ischarging [their] responsibilities fairly and impartially” and by “upholding 
the rule of law.”130 Rather, the point is that thinking of jurors as fiduciaries who 
represent “the people” does not by itself illuminate the nature of their obliga-
tions as moral judgment-makers and may, in fact, encourage a way of thinking 
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of jurors that is at odds with the core obligation of the criminal jury to be inde-
pendent and to be first and foremost loyal to the rule of law. 
V. WHY SHOULD JURORS MIRROR THE COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE? 
If the idea of the jurors as the conscience, representatives, or fiduciaries of 
the community does not help us answer the question about the nature of the 
moral inquiry jurors are engaged in for a variety of reasons canvassed above, 
we may be better off shifting the focus from the general form of the criminal 
jury’s role to its substance. There may still be several independent normative 
reasons to think of the jurors’ job as mirroring the community’s perspective in 
the criminal law context, and here I review a few. 
A. The Expressive Dimension of Punishment 
The institution of punishment has a communicative, expressive dimen-
sion. When the state punishes, it condemns what the offender has done as 
blameworthy, and it communicates to the offender that what he has done is 
wrong. As Antony Duff formulates it, the criminal law “declares and defines 
mala in se, and creates mala prohibita, as public wrongs from which citizens 
should refrain,” and crimes are accordingly “public wrongs” that “merit a pub-
lic, communal response” in the form of “authoritative, communal condemna-
tion of such wrongs” through conviction and punishment.131 One who is in-
spired by this way of thinking about punishment132 might reason as follows: if 
it is the case that our criminal justice system reflects such a system of commu-
nal responses to wrongs, and the criminal jury is a body that is charged with the 
responsibility of expressing such condemnation, then it appears to follow that 
the jurors are “representatives” who act on behalf of the community. Accord-
ingly, the argument might go, jurors ought to attempt to determine the commu-
nity’s position on the moral blameworthiness of the conduct in question as the 
jury reaches its decisions. 
B. Democracy 
Victoria Nourse has argued that the “norms” applied by the criminal law 
“must be majoritarian” and that the jury’s aim is to “reflect[] . . . majoritarian 
norms,” and this, she has explained, means being “attentive . . . to general soci-
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etal rules of behavior.”133 Nourse adds that “a jury that applies Stalinist norms 
to the defendant violates basic rules of our constitutional order.”134 The basic 
idea here is that in a democratic society like ours, laws are enacted through the 
democratic process, and, if done well, the laws should reflect the viewpoint of 
“the people.” Given that the jurors are tasked with interpreting and enforcing 
criminal laws as they apply them to defendants, they should keep in mind the 
democratic groundings of these laws and should thus attempt to line up the 
laws’ views with the views of the people. This, in turn, implies that when jurors 
enforce moral elements, they ought to attempt to find out what the people be-
lieve and apply such beliefs. 
C. Notice 
As the Labrie and Peterson cases mentioned above illustrate, crime defini-
tions often rely on the notion of the “reasonable person,” and as John Gardner 
points out, “the reasonable person” can be portrayed as the enemy of legal cer-
tainty.135 The phrase is vague and details are left to factfinders to work out. The 
ideal of legality and giving citizens fair notice of what the law requires are es-
pecially important in the criminal law context, where consequences of being 
held liable are dramatic. To the extent that terms like “reasonableness” place a 
person’s behavior in the grey area of criminality, there is a danger of there be-
ing insufficient notice before the law is enforced against him. Gardner says that 
the reasonable person test is accordingly “reined in” in various ways in order to 
mitigate the rule of law concerns the standard carries, and one of those ways is 
by appealing to the idea of an “ordinary,” “typical,” or “average” person.136 
Similar notice considerations suggest that jurors should apply moral terms in 
crime definitions in terms of prevailing norms in a community.137 
Legal scholars generally think the response that an ordinary person is of-
ten not “reasonable” is an insufficient answer to the notice problem. If what dif-
ferent moral terms mean in a particular context comes across as a surprise to 
ordinary citizens, there can be a problem of notice. Someone like Mayo Moran 
might object that such a concern is misplaced given that the argument “I, an or-
dinary person, did not know that is what reasonableness demanded,” would be 
tantamount to raising a mistake of law defense, and ignorance of the law is no 
excuse.138 However, the mistake of law doctrine is no help since the most con-
troversial mistake of law cases involve situations where the notice problem is 
 
 133.  Nourse, supra note 84, at 48. She also emphasizes that such majoritarian norms must be “restrained,” 
but what she means by “restrained” is that the jury must “restrain vengeance,” so this qualification, while im-
portant for her argument, is not relevant to the question we are interested in here. 
 134.  Id. at 37. 
 135.  Gardner, supra note 54, at 564. 
 136.  Id. at 576–77. 
 137.  Id. at 575 (describing the view where a juror is supposed to determine “not whether a certain action, 
belief, decision etc. was justified but whether people, or some people would in her judgment think it was justi-
fied”). 
 138.  MORAN, supra note 69, at 235–37; see also Baron, supra note 26, at 30. 
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the most serious.139 Invoking the mistake of law idea, thus, serves only to high-
light the potential notice problems that may arise when one departs from ordi-
nary understandings of moral terms. 
D. Culpability 
According to a standard account of culpability and responsibility, capacity 
is an important factor to consider when holding people criminally responsible. 
That is, if one lacks the capacity to do something, then one should not be held 
responsible for failure to do that thing.140 
If it is indeed the case that the reasonable person standard is a way of im-
plementing the principle that one should not be held criminally responsible for 
failing to do something he lacks the capacity for, that is a reason to set the 
standard of the reasonable person at a realistic level. It may all be fine and, as 
Saira Mohamed has argued, maybe criminal law is “an aspirational tool” that 
“envisions a set of behaviors that one day might become the norm.”141 But if 
the aspirational standard is set so high that it is unrealistic to expect ordinary 
citizens to live up to it, then we could end up treating individuals unfairly. The 
reasonable person standard should not make unreasonable demands, and one 
way of avoiding this is to set what the reasonable person standard requires at 
the level of the ordinary person. The same rationale applies to jurors when they 
are to give meaning to moral terms. That is, the reason to interpret legal stand-
ards by referring to how an average member of the community would under-
stand it can be one way of ensuring fair treatment of criminal defendants by set-
ting aspirational standards at a reasonable level. 
So, there are a number of reasons to think that the jury’s job when inter-
preting vague moral terms is to inquire into what the relevant community be-
lieves and enforce such beliefs. 
VI. JURORS AND THE COMMUNITY 
A. How Jurors Contribute 
The question this Article has been asking is what jurors are obligated to 
do as they perform their duty. How should we think about such obligations? I 
suggest we start thinking of their obligations as political obligations, or obliga-
tions individuals owe to the state. Because we are talking of jurors, the type of 
obligations we have at issue in this scheme are “role obligations”—obligations 
that jurors owe as jurors or, more specifically, as participants in and citizen-
administrators of a state institution. So, in order to understand what obligations 
 
 139.  See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). 
 140.  Cf. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 152 
(1968) [hereinafter HART, PUNISHMENT]. Whether Hart’s particular understanding of responsibility is the same 
as the view described here is not my concern. The point merely is that the idea of one’s capacity is of central 
importance in attributions of responsibility. 
 141.  Mohamed, supra note 72, at 1676. 
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jurors have, we need an understanding of how the jury system contributes to the 
existing scheme of state institutions. 
1. Jurors Are Not Like Contestants on Family Feud 
We may start by making the obvious observation that when jurors are 
asked to decide whether a person is guilty in a criminal trial, they are asked 
whether the defendant committed the crime charged, and not whether the de-
fendant committed the crime charged according to the community. That is, the 
question that the jury is asked is not like the question that contestants on the 
show Family Feud are asked. On Family Feud, the contestants are not asked 
what, say, the most useful kitchen appliance is but are asked to guess what the 
survey says the most useful kitchen appliance is. Similarly, if we are really in-
terested in asking jurors to replicate the community’s perspective on moral 
questions, we could simply ask that question, but that is not the question we 
ask. We instead ask the jurors whether a person was unreasonable, reckless, 
lacked consent, and so on. 
2. Jurors Are Given the Task of Giving Content to Vague Terms 
When jurors make moral judgments in applying crime definitions, they 
have some discretion because these moral terms—such as “reckless,” “cruel,” 
and “debauch a child’s morals”—are indeterminate. More specifically, they are 
vague and contestable and carry specific connotations that need to be grasped 
in order to apply them correctly. To understand the jurors’ role in all this, we 
need an understanding of why such vague terms are used in the first place. 
The role of vagueness in law is a topic that has been much discussed.142 
For one thing, indeterminate terms, by avoiding committing to answers on dif-
ficult questions, help us avoid erroneous decisions. It is sometimes difficult for 
legislators to specify in advance how people ought to behave in given situa-
tions. They may not be able to foresee all scenarios that fall within the scope of 
behaviors the law seeks to regulate and could end up making mistakes if they 
try to formulate rules for all situations. If they attempt to foresee all factual 
scenarios in advance and specify what ought to happen in each instance, the 
law in that area may be so complex and unwieldy that it would in fact start to 
compromise the guidance function of the law.143 For instance, there are many 
different ways for a person to cause another person to die in a reckless manner. 
Some situations may come up often enough—say driving while heavily intoxi-
cated—that bright-line rules may make sense, but there are more ways in which 
 
 142.  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124–36 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing “open texture”) 
[hereinafter HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW]; Timothy A. O. Endicott, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 19 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–7 (1999). 
 143.  See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 32–33 (2012) (“Vagueness . . . is often intentional, as general terms (reasonable time, best efforts, equal 
protection) are adopted to cover a multitude of situations that cannot practicably be spelled out in detail or even 
foreseen.” (emphasis removed)). 
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people can behave recklessly and cause death than we can specify or even im-
agine in advance. In such cases, it may be error-inducing to attempt to improve 
upon the formulation that one may be convicted of manslaughter if one causes 
a person’s death in a reckless manner. 
So when does the ultimate decision get made? When, for example, ques-
tions arise as to whether a particular death occurred due to a person’s reckless-
ness, the legal system must come to a resolution. We cannot just tell people to 
stop behaving recklessly and hope for the best. Deaths will happen, questiona-
ble behaviors leading to the deaths will be identified, and the government has to 
decide whether the legally established penal consequences for people who are 
responsible for such deaths should apply. Therefore, even though indetermina-
cy may be ineliminable and even desirable, determinate resolutions must be 
made.144 As Hart puts it, there sometimes exists a “need to leave open, for later 
settlement by an informed, official choice, issues which can only be properly 
appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case.”145 The key idea 
here is that when we have indeterminate terms in law, what is happening is del-
egation of the legislative authority to decision-makers in different times and 
places when they are in better positions to make them.146 
So, if this is what jurors are doing—making “an informed, official choice” 
about whether a particular act falls into one moral category or another—then 
the question the jurors ought to ask is what these moral terms mean as applied 
to particular contexts. The delegation to the jury is to determine how the law 
ought to be applied, and not to determine how “the community” believes the 
law ought to be applied. Given that the idea here is to reach better decisions by 
seeing how a general idea plays out in a particular context, jurors who have ac-
cess to such particular facts are better positioned to determine just that (how the 
general idea applies in a particular context) than to determine how the commu-
nity at large would view the same question. 
The debate on popular constitutionalism, which we may characterize 
roughly as the view that judges ought to take into account what the ordinary 
people understand the Constitution to mean when interpreting the Constitution, 
 
 144.  HART, PUNISHMENT, supra note 140, at 132–33 (discussing negligence). 
 145.  HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 142, at 130. 
 146.  Youngjae Lee, Reasonable Doubt and Moral Elements, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 27 
(2015); see Joseph Raz, Sorensen: Vagueness Has No Function in Law, 7 LEGAL THEORY 417, 419 (2001). Raz 
states: 
Making law, we say, is and should be a collaborative enterprise. Different aspects of the law are made by 
different institutions at different times, involving courts, Congress, state legislatures, local authorities, 
administrative authorities, regulatory authorities, and more. It is important that the right bodies will con-
tribute the right elements to the law, and that they should do so at the right time. Therefore, when wisely 
used, all means and devices that ration powers to make the law among public organs and that regulate the 
time for the use of such powers have an important function in the law. Vagueness is one source of discre-
tion. As such it is a power-regulating device and therefore has an important function. 
Id. 
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has some parallels here.147 Consider this criticism of popular constitutionalism 
by David Pozen: 
The problem is not that laypersons are unable to develop intelligible, re-
spectworthy preferences on questions of constitutional law . . . but rather 
that they are unlikely to hold such preferences on the precise sorts of 
questions that come before a court. State judges do not address constitu-
tional disputes in a vacuum. They do so in the context of specific cases, 
laden with all manner of supplemental claims, factual particularities, pro-
cedural histories, jurisdictional complexities, and doctrinal precedents 
that shape and constrain the judicial task. Ordinary citizens have neither 
the training, nor the resources, nor the responsibility to engage constitu-
tional disputes in the way that judges must engage them.148 
Similarly, we might say that, even though it is the case that “the people” 
hold opinions on the meaning of various moral terms that jurors consider and 
apply, the people at large are unlikely to have positions on the “precise sorts of 
questions” that come before a jury. Juries address moral questions in “the con-
text of specific cases” that are laden with “factual particularities,” and the peo-
ple do not engage moral questions in the way that jurors must engage them.149 
If we, despite all this, ask jurors to determine what the community might think 
the moral terms mean in this particular context, we would be asking them to 
take up guesswork about what some abstract entity that has never thought about 
an issue might think about it, as opposed to simply state what they, the jurors, 
think. 
Therefore, asking individual jurors to discern the community perspective 
would be an oddly roundabout and potentially error-prone way of getting at 
what the community believes. If we were really interested in what the commu-
nity thinks rather than the jurors themselves, then it seems that legislators are 
better positioned to do such a thing given that they are elected and are held ac-
countable by the electorate. So, if jurors, when answering a moral question in 
order to apply a crime definition, attempt to figure out how the community 
would answer the question instead of simply answering the question, they 
would most likely be answering the wrong question. 
3. Jurors Bring a Diversity of Viewpoints 
Furthermore, consider what jurors as a group bring as a distinct advantage 
in problem solving: diversity of viewpoints. The benefits of diversity in collec-
tive decision-making have been noted by many. Aristotle observed that “the 
many, of whom each individual is not a good man, when they meet together 
may be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, 
just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a 
 
 147.  David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2048–
49 (2010). 
 148.  Id. at 2120–21. 
 149.  Id. at 2121. 
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single purse.”150 So far, Aristotle is making only a numbers argument, but no-
tice his explanation: 
For each individual among the many has a share of excellence and practi-
cal wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a man-
ner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses, so too with re-
gard to their character and thought. Hence the many are better judges than 
a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and 
some another, and among them they understand the whole.151 
The idea here is that different people can bring different perspectives to a 
task, and as a group can “understand the whole” better than those who under-
stand “only one part” when isolated from others.152 As Jeremy Waldron later 
puts it in his interpretation of the above passage: 
[Aristotle’s] view is that deliberation among the many is a way of bring-
ing each citizen’s ethical views and insights . . . to bear on the views and 
insights of each of the others, so that they cast light on each other, provid-
ing a basis for reciprocal questioning and criticism and enabling a view to 
emerge which is better than any of the inputs and much more than a mere 
aggregation or function of those inputs.153 
More recently, numerous political theorists have made similar arguments. 
Iris Young, for instance, has argued that “social group differentiation, especial-
ly the experience derived from structural differentiation,” is “a resource” that 
we need to draw on.154 She explains that “[c]ommunication of the experience 
and knowledge derived from different social positions helps correct biases de-
rived from the dominance of partial perspective over the definition of problems 
or their possible solutions” and that “inclusion of different social groups in . . . 
decision-making increase[s] . . . the store of social knowledge available to par-
ticipants” and also “increase[s] the likelihood of promoting justice” by taking 
“interests of all . . . into account.”155 
Jon Elster similarly, albeit with a different emphasis, notes that “a diverse 
group of decision makers . . . may produce better decisions than a group of in-
dividually excellent decision makers” due to “the exchange of information 
among decision makers, each of whom may possess specialized knowledge.”156 
Robert Goodin, too, argues that “[w]here people have only very different and 
very partial views on the overall situation . . . the truth is sometimes better 
found . . . in the union—the conjunction—of their reports.”157 Elizabeth Ander-
son also observes that “individuals are most familiar with the effects of prob-
lems and policies on themselves and those close to them, information about 
these effects is also asymmetrically distributed . . . according to their geograph-
 
 150.  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 66 (Stephen Everson ed., 1988). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  For a survey of similar arguments, see Landemore, supra note 87, at 59–64. 
 153.  JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 106 (1999). 
 154.  YOUNG, supra note 94, at 83. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 279 (2013). 
 157.  ROBERT GOODIN, REFLECTIVE DEMOCRACY 140 (2003). 
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ic location, social class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so 
forth.”158 Diversity of perspectives enables the system “to pool this asymmetri-
cally distributed information.”159 In addition, diversity is valuable not only be-
cause it enables pooling of information from different perspectives but also be-
cause it can “remove some of the distortions” of what Cass Sunstein has called 
“group polarization,”160 a phenomenon where “like-minded people, insulated 
from others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument 
pools and parochial influences.”161 
So, many people sing the praises of diversity, but what does all this mean 
for our purposes? Recall that the question on the table is what obligations jurors 
have when facing moral questions, and the answer to that question in turn de-
pends on how jurors are to contribute to the legal institutions for which they are 
recruited. And the options that we are considering are either jurors ought to 
identify where the broader community stands on particular moral questions or 
jurors ought to answer moral questions by applying their own individual moral 
beliefs. If it is the case that the criminal jury is to “stand in” for the community, 
then the first option seems more correct. What the discussion of virtues of di-
versity in group deliberation show, however, is that an attempt to identify 
where the “community” stands on various moral questions when interpreting 
and enforcing moral elements of crime definitions would be a counterproduc-
tive use of jurors as a social resource. When different jurors work on a common 
task, they can, as a group, reach better decisions than they would if they were to 
make decisions individually, precisely because of the different perspectives 
they bring to it. Given that it is the ways in which the jurors differ from one an-
other that contributes to decision-making, the appropriate way for jurors to con-
tribute to the task is by bringing their individual perspectives and beliefs, as 
opposed to the beliefs of “the community,” whatever that may be. 
In short, even if all the talk of the jurors being “community representa-
tives” implies that jurors need to take into account what “the community’s” 
views are, the way in which we deploy jurors to speak for the community is 
precisely by asking them not to speak for the community but for each to speak 
for himself or herself. We are recruiting them as individuals with individual 
views, perspectives, and beliefs, not as representatives or fiduciaries (with all 
the attendant obligations the terms imply). We should look at jurors in this way 
and ask for individual perspectives as they deliberate, and jurors correspond-
ingly should participate by giving their own views as opposed to attempting to 
replicate “the community perspective” because individuals, by bringing indi-
vidual perspectives, bring diversity to the group, and diversity in turn contrib-
utes to better decisions. Jurors, in other words, cooperate and advance the sys-
tem most effectively by being themselves and not by attempting to shoulder the 
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burden of serving as “representatives,” and their political obligations as jurors 
are best fulfilled when they bring their personal beliefs to the task. It further 
follows, then, that when jurors face moral questions as they enforce criminal 
laws, they should similarly consult their individual moral beliefs and not the 
beliefs of the community. 
B. Reconsidering Why Jurors Should Mirror the Community Perspective 
1. Expressive Dimension of Punishment 
If, as argued above, the criminal law addresses “public wrongs” that 
“merit a public, communal response” and delivers “authoritative, communal 
condemnation of such wrongs,”162 the criminal jury’s job would be to deliver 
such communal condemnations. Numerous legal scholars have described the 
role of the criminal jury in just such terms. Kim Taylor-Thompson, for in-
stance, has said that the point of the jury is “to bring the considered judgment 
of the community to bear on significant questions of justice.”163 Stephanos Bi-
bas says that “[t]he jury serves as the chorus of a Greek tragedy, ‘the con-
science of the community,’” and that “[i]t applies the community’s moral code, 
pronounces the judgment, and brands or exonerates the defendant.”164 Ronald 
Wright has argued that “[o]ne of the primary functions of a jury” is “to express 
the moral sentiment of the community in applying the law.”165 
But how is all this supposed to work? As even a jury enthusiast like Nan-
cy Marder, who has argued that juries “bring their sense of community norms 
into the process of applying the law to the facts,” acknowledges, “[t]here are 
different levels of community, and each may differ in its response to a jury’s 
verdict,” and “[a] decision that angers one group in a community may appease 
another.”166 If this is the case, then a juror who attempts to in fact identify “the 
community” and report its views on this or that may be at a loss as to how to go 
about doing his or her job. 
The answer to this question should now be clear: There is no need for 
each juror to understand where “the community” stands on a given issue. The 
jury does “stand in” for the community, but the jury performs that role through 
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people acting not as representatives but as individuals with personal moral be-
liefs on the relevant issue. Therefore, all this talk about the jury speaking for 
the community can confuse the issues because jurors ought not see themselves 
as representing the community or having constituents. They should only speak 
for themselves. Of course, they should have a clear understanding that the ques-
tion they are asked to answer is what is appropriate for the community to con-
demn through criminal law, but the question always should be understood as 
implicitly being accompanied by the phrase “in your view,” as opposed to “in 
the community’s view.” 
2. Democracy 
What about the argument based in democracy? The basic idea, as men-
tioned above, is that in a democratic society like ours, laws are enacted through 
the democratic process, and, if done well, the laws should reflect the viewpoint 
of “the people.” Does this not mean that when jurors enforce moral elements, 
they ought to attempt to find out what the people believe and apply such be-
liefs? 
The answer is no. It is not the case that democracy requires government 
actors to replicate the people’s perspective at every stage of every government 
action. As argued above, a democratic society assigns different roles to differ-
ent parts of the system, but those roles do not necessarily make direct refer-
ences to the people because it is not the case that a democratic government has 
to have democracy in every part of the government. In the jurors’ case, the ju-
rors are serving the cause of democracy by participating in the process of adju-
dication as individual jurors with individual beliefs who are exercising interpre-
tive powers delegated to them by the legal system. By speaking only for 
themselves, they are engaging in democratic governance, and the concept of 
democracy does not require that they take the further step of identifying and 
applying the people’s perspectives on individual legal questions. 
3. Notice 
As to the problem of notice: this concern, too, need not be addressed by 
asking jurors to replicate the community perspective. This Article is about 
vague and evaluative terms like “unjustifiable,” “reasonable,” “depraved,” and 
“cruel.” It may be the case that the notice aspect of law would improve if jurors 
attempted to find the community perspective when deliberating and deciding. 
The standard, however, is not to give as much notice as possible, but to give 
sufficient notice to serve as a fair warning. Vague terms may be problematic 
from the rule of law perspective, but at the same time, vagueness in the crimi-
nal law can serve a legitimate function, in addition to the functions already 
mentioned above. 
We may have indeterminate terms as a way of warning citizens to stay 
well away from questionable practices, to proceed with care, to think about the 
purposes of the laws they may be coming close to violating, to deliberate about 
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the meaning of words like “cruelty” and “reasonable,” and so on. Indeterminate 
terms can be useful law enforcement devices because they induce people to 
stay away from gray areas and make it difficult for citizens to identify the areas 
in which they can engage in dubious behaviors and “get away with it.” In fact, 
familiar ordinary moral terms with vague contours may give citizens more in-
formation as to what not to do than precise technical legalese that spells out in 
detail what is prohibited.167 Given all this, as long as the jury’s interpretations 
of moral terms are within the range of reasonableness, there is sufficient, fair 
notice despite the state’s use of vague terms, even if some of these interpreta-
tions may end up being minority views. 
4. Culpability 
As mentioned above, the culpability argument in favor of the view that ju-
rors ought to reflect the community perspective is based on the notion that we 
should not be too demanding of individuals. The concern is valid, but it does 
not mean that jurors should be asked to attempt to mirror the community in or-
der to be fair to individuals. Each of the jurors, in his or her deliberation, can 
ask how to set the legal standard so that the law does not demand too much 
from the people and answer it according to his or her individual beliefs about 
what is appropriate for the state to demand from its citizens. This concern, like 
the question about the appropriateness of the state punishing certain conduct, 
can be incorporated into each juror’s individual deliberation. Again, by bring-
ing individual perspectives to the question of how the state ought to treat its cit-
izens, jurors would be helping the legal system come to better decisions on the 
question of culpability. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the ways in which jurors are to approach moral 
questions in criminal cases. More specifically, this Article has asked whether a 
juror, when making moral judgments, should follow his or her individual moral 
beliefs or identify and implement the community’s perspective. 
Many things said about the criminal jury appear to support the view that 
the jurors are to attempt to replicate the community’s perspective. It is often 
said, for instance, the criminal jury serves as the community’s conscience, rep-
resentative, or fiduciary, and such formulations suggest an obligation on the 
part of the jurors to reproduce the community’s perspective. This Article has 
argued that despite the popularity of such accounts, they are either too indeter-
minate to imply an obligation on the part of the jurors to reproduce the commu-
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nity’s perspective, or are in conflict with the fundamental role obligation of ju-
rors to adjudicate fairly and accurately. We may, in fact, be better off jettison-
ing the talk of the jury as the community’s conscience, representative, or fidu-
ciary, at least in this context. We should instead embrace the notion that jurors 
fulfill their roles in the criminal justice system most effectively when they vote 
as individuals, not as representatives, by applying legal standards to particular 
situations and bringing a diversity of viewpoints to the task. 
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